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The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or Somewhere Else
Altogether
Abstract
The Basque Country exhibits contradictory symptoms of good health and chronic internal rupture. A
flexible and robust economy and a vibrant cultural life are undermined by opposed senses of identity,
which make almost any statement about the region deeply contentious. The verifiability—or otherwise—of
Basque nationalist and Spanish nationalist readings of Basque history and culture matter less today than
the fact that they are held with genuine conviction by big sectors of Basque society. Both traditions have
their own legitimacy, but neither has been capable of fully acknowledging or including the other.
Paradoxically, Francoism reinforced Basque nationalist identity, and anxieties about the survival of the
Basque language stimulated radical Basque nationalism, with enduring consequences. An
accommodation might be found in acceptance by both sides that Basque identities are multiple, and
through recognition that there are several ways of being Basque, none of which need negate any of the
others. The recent Irish settlement offers some pointers, though no rigid templates. Bernardo Atxaga’s
declaration that Euskera is not the Basque language, but a Basque language, is an indication that this
process of respecting multiple identities is already underway, though the obstacles to a resolution remain
formidable.
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The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or
Somewhere Else Altogether
Paddy Woodworth
“Nafarroa Euskadi da. Lo siento en mi sangre” ‘Navarre is the
Basque Country. I feel it in my blood’ (A supporter of the izquierda abertzale, author interview)
“Euskadi no es sólo una parte de España, es el corazón de España” ‘The Basque Country is not just part of Spain, it is the
heart of Spain’ (Jaime Mayor Oreja, author interview)
“Euskera is not the Basque language. It is a Basque language.
We are rich in the Basque Country, we have three languages,
Euskera, Spanish and French. And now, with globalization and
rock’n’roll, we have a fourth language, English” (Bernardo Atxaga, author interview)

The long-running crisis of identity in—and about—the Basque
Country is a more chronic condition than a nervous breakdown.
The symptoms of hysteria, paranoia, depression, stress, delusion and
exhaustion are all certainly present in the patient. But we must make
a more severe diagnosis here. The Basque Country is suffering from
a crippling internal rupture. And, to adapt a phrase made notorious
by Xabier Arzalluz, an acerbic leader of the Basque Nationalist Party
(PNV), this disorder creates ulcers in the Basque and Spanish bodies politic that have bled copiously for many years, and often result
in fatalities. The psychic wounds produced by the Basque conflict
are equally dramatic, equally disabling.1
And yet the patient, whether Basque, Spanish, or both at the
same time, often exhibits the appearance of robust good health.
The Basque government enjoys powers as broad as any region in
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Europe, and has made the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (CAV)
into an economic and—in many respects—cultural success story.
Post-Guggenheim Bilbao is a beacon of sophistication to the elite
international traveler, and can seem not only at ease, but at one
with itself. Down the coast from Bilbao, the San Antolines fiesta
in Lekeitio has all the appearance of an exuberant outburst of civic
pride, community participation, energy and joy. The small Basque
region is home to half a dozen prestigious and cosmopolitan cultural festivals, from dance in Biarritz to jazz in Vitoria. Then there
is the quintessentially Spanish-Basque fusion fiesta of Sanfermines
in Pamplona. As for eating out, you sometimes feel that Michelin
stars are scattered across the region like confetti at a wedding. On
the French side of the border, there are Basque ikurriñas the ‘Basque
national flag’ fluttering gaily alongside French tricolors, and entire
streets where Basque identity is transmuted into innocent and profitable kitsch in the form of souvenirs.
If the region is suffering from a chronic illness, a casual observer might remark, we should all be as sick as this. Yet the consequences of a chronic crisis of identity shadow every aspect of Basque
life I have just referenced. An ertzaina ‘policeman in the service of
the Basque Autonomous Community’ was shot dead by ETA right
under Jeff Koons’s Puppy, that durable emblem of the playful postmodern spirit of the Guggenheim-Bilbao project, on the eve of the
museum’s inauguration. Talk for even a few moments to many of
the revelers in Lekeitio’s fiesta, to find out that they are seething
with anger at their disenfranchisement as Batasuna voters and at
a judicial offensive which is sweeping many radical activists indiscriminately into jail. Many of the other revelers, who may not talk
so freely, live in well-founded fear of Batasuna’s associates in ETA
and the kale borroka ‘street struggle,’ and feel compelled to hide any
expression of Spanish identity.2 The gastronomic temple where you
have just had the best meal of your life may be laundering money for
terrorists. Those innocent French Basque streets were the setting for
state terrorist attacks sponsored by Madrid’s PSOE administration
in the 1980s.3 And so on.
Where, then, to begin the diagnosis of so grim yet so elusive an
illness, or rather illnesses, because nothing in the Basque Country is
singular? Perhaps we should start with geography, to find some purhttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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chase for our thoughts, some orientation for our ideas. Immediately,
though, we run into difficulties, because the Basque landscape is
driven with territorial claims and counter-claims, and any orientation will be interpreted as an ideological position by one group or
another. Hesitation comes naturally to any halfway sensitive writer
on the Basques, because one very soon learns that the simplest sentence about the place and its people will always be construed as partisan by someone. No assumptions here can be politically innocent.
An anecdote to illustrate this difficulty: a Spanish cultural administrator I had met in my native Ireland wrote me a charming email
some years back. He told me he had accepted a position with the
Foral Government of Navarre, and kindly offered me any assistance
I might ever require in writing about this ancient kingdom. Shortly
afterwards, I was commissioned by Signal Books and Oxford University Press to write a book on the Basque Country for their series
“Landscapes of the Imagination.” In due course, I wrote to my new
friend, asking for his help with the project, insofar as it related to
Navarre. Of course, he never replied. From the point of view of the
government he was now serving, Navarre is simply not part of the
Basque Country, so he could offer me nothing.
This rigid exclusion of Navarre from the Basque Country,
however, was not always the position of the Spanish establishment.
The censors of Franco’s dictatorship, for example, raised no objection whatsoever when Pío Baroja wrote a guide book to the Basque
Country in the 1950s which not only included Navarre but made it
the centre-piece of his account of the region. Baroja had always been
harshly critical of Basque nationalism. But his physical and spiritual
home was the valley in which the Bidasoa river unites Navarre, the
French Basque Country, and the region which is today known as
the CAV. He had no hesitation in ascribing Basque identity in equal
measure to all three places. The rift between Navarre and the other
Basque provinces is a relatively recent one, a response by Spanish
nationalists (of both the left and right) to the claims of Basque nationalism.
Spanish nationalists and conservatives have no monopoly on
exclusion. The member of the izquierda abertzale ‘left’ quoted at
the start of this article refuses to recognize any Spanish identity in
Navarre. More moderate Basque nationalists all too often exclude
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Baroja himself from the canon of Basque literature, partly because
he wrote in Castilian, and partly because of his hostility to their
ideology. Miguel de Unamuno, Blas de Otero, Gabriel Celaya and
other distinguished writers of Basque origin are also dismissed as
“Spanish” on similar grounds. It should not be forgotten, of course,
that Irish nationalists generally offered a similarly cold shoulder to
James Joyce for many years. It was only after independent Ireland
gained grown-up self-confidence in the 1960s that Ulysses was unbanned, and that the cosmopolitan Joyce has become as much—
and more—an icon of the Irish nation as narrow-minded “patriotic”
writers like Paraic Pearse, the leader of the 1916 Easter Rising which
sparked the Irish War of Independence. Things change, and then
they change again.
So, for the purposes of this article, I propose to consider the
Basque Country as seven provinces, including the CAV, Navarre
and the three provinces currently under French administration.
This is not to endorse the Basque nationalist slogan Zazpiak Bat
‘the Seven are One.’ It may be just as appropriate, or more, to say
Zazpiak Zazpi ‘the Seven are Seven.’ It is certainly not to pre-judge
the political status of any part of the region. It is simply to recognize a long and deep cultural association and identity between all
seven provinces. Conversely, we should also recognize that all the
provinces have their own individual identities, as well as long and
deep cultural associations with the adjoining regions, and with the
nation-states of France and Spain. If that is the geographical territory we are going to consider, perhaps we should now move straight
to the political questions which makes the issue of Basque identity
such a contentious and painful one, at least on the Spanish side of
the Pyrenees.4 These questions are: to what extent should we recognize as legitimate the fracture which Basque nationalists perceive as
dividing their country from Spain? A question which must always
be paired with its twin: to what extent should we recognize as legitimate the common ground which many other Basques perceive as
uniting their region with the Spanish national project?
Let us take the Basque nationalist position—or rather positions,
because nothing is straightforward here—first. Sabino Arana, the
founding father of Basque nationalist ideology, like many European
nationalists of the late nineteenth century, based his case for a dishttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1702
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tinct national identity partly on racial grounds. His successors in the
Partido Nationalista Vasco (PNV) ‘Basque Nationalist Party’ have
shifted the argument to (somewhat) more politically correct ethnocultural and historical differentiations. ETA and the izquierda abertzale have in turn stressed language and even class (the concept of
the PTV, the Pueblo Trabajador Vasco, the ‘Basque Working People)
as key signifiers of membership of the Basque polis.
We could spend a great deal of time and space here deconstructing Basque nationalist historical, cultural and ideological
canards. But however historically skewed or ideologically twisted
some Basque nationalist claims may be, the Basques do have at
their disposal many, if not all, of the primary materials with which
peoples construct legitimate national identities, and we will return
to these materials later. In any case, focusing on the bogus nature
of some Basque nationalist claims may not assist us very much in
understanding the Basque Country today. Many studies on nationalism suggest that while exposing the fallacious or partial nature
of nationalist readings of history, and highlighting the flaws in nationalist ideologies, is a necessary and salutary exercise, it misses a
very important point, indeed the central one. This point was made a
long time ago by the French historian Ernest Renan: “Amnesia, and
I would even say historical error, are an essential part of the formation of a nation” (Hobsbawm 12). Renan himself thought that more
accurate historical research would undermine nationalist positions.
But despite the best efforts of many historians, like Eric Hobsbawm
a century later, this does not appear to have been the case. As Hugh
Seton-Watson wrote in 1977: “A nation exists when a significant
number of people in a community consider themselves to form a
nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the
whole of a population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected” (5).
The legitimacy of the Basque claim to nationhood, according
to this view, rests not so much on the veracity of its historical, cultural or ideological underpinnings, but on the degree to which it is
accepted as a norm by Basque citizens today. The same, of course,
applies to Spanish claims to nationhood, inside and outside the
Basque Country. Two valuable recent studies, The Reinvention of
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Spain by Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, and Imagining
Spain by Henry Kamen, remind us that Spanish nationalists have
been no slouches in transforming dubious historical theses into
political holy writ. Basque nationalism may be just as creative in
relation to its origins, and just as real in its ideological force, as is
Spanish nationalism, or any other nationalism. But can we say that a
“significant number” of contemporary Basques have demonstrated
a desire for a national identity distinct from that of Spain? The vote
on the referendum on the 1978 Spanish constitution in the CAV
suggests that they have.
Basque nationalists campaigned either for abstention or a “No”
vote on the Constitution, essentially because that document did
not include a Basque right to self-determination.5 The PNV had
not been included directly in the parliamentary commission which
drew up the Constitution. They felt betrayed by the PSOE and the
Communist Party (PCE), which had both supported Basque selfdetermination in the late Franco period but quietly dumped this
position during the constitutional discussions (Francisco Bustelo
50). These parties made this shift for two reasons: they knew the
principle of self-determination was unacceptable to the poderes fácticos ‘de facto powers’—military, financial and ecclesiastical—who
conditioned the supposedly exemplary constitutional negotiations
to a very considerable extent; and they knew that many of their own
supporters were Spanish nationalists and deeply hostile to Basque
“separatism.” Curiously, many PSOE leaders display total amnesia
when reminded of this volte face ‘about-face’ today.
The Basque nationalist campaign against the Constitution was
remarkably successful. Only 31% of the electorate in the CAV voted
in favour of the constitution, as against 59% in Spain as a whole–and,
indeed, as against 61% of the electorate in that other Iberian fiefdom
of “peripheral nationalism,” Catalonia. And 10% of the Basque electorate voted “No,” double the number across the whole state. It is
important to add, at once, that of those Basques who did vote, 75%
voted in favor of the new arrangements (against 88% in Spain overall). The Basque “No” vote represented 25% of participants, three
times the Spanish (and Catalan) average. Predictably, these figures
are read by Basque and Spanish nationalists in diametrically opposed ways. For Basque nationalists, the Basque people—the whole
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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electorate—has never given its majority assent to the Constitution.
For Spanish nationalists, a ringingly clear majority—three quarters—of Basque voters approved the foundational text of modern
democratic Spain. They argue that abstention figures are notoriously open to any interpretation one cares to give them. Furthermore,
Spanish nationalists add, a majority of the Basque electorate (53%)
did support the Basque Statute of Autonomy in a referendum only
two years later. And that statute is firmly set within the limits of the
1978 constitution, and had the support of the PNV. The statute was
even endorsed by the political-military wing of ETA, whose political
surrogates in Euskadiko Ezkerra called for a “Yes” vote in the second referendum, having advocated a “No” vote in 1978.6 This broad
vote for the statute shows, Spanish nationalists say, that the Basque
people supported the Constitution retrospectively, at the very least.
The Basque nationalists have their counter-arguments. They
point out that subsequent elections have constantly yielded an overall majority to parties which proposed either abstention or rejection
of the Constitution. This tends to support their interpretation of the
very high level of abstention in 1978. As for accepting the Statute
of Autonomy, most Basque nationalists contend that they agreed
its terms as a pragmatic holding operation, not as a principled expression of their core position on Basque identity. It would have
been suicide for the PNV not to seize the opportunities offered by
the very significant powers Madrid was conceding to Vitoria (the
Basque administrative capital), but such acceptance should never
have been taken to imply a final settlement. In recent years the PNV
has repeatedly insisted that these powers, though they are extensive,
are not commensurate with Basque status (in their eyes) as a sovereign nation. With 20 years elapsed, they say, and in a Spain where
democracy has been consolidated and the poderes fácticos firmly
subjected (one hopes) to the rule of law, it is not unreasonable to
renegotiate a constitution that was reached under the duress of military tutelage, and to which a majority of Basques never subscribed
in the first place.
I have focused here on the arguments around the constitutional
referendum outcome not because I think they clinch the issue of
Basque nationhood either way, but because they reveal a significant
fissure between many Basques and the constitution’s model of con-
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vivencia or ‘co-existence.’ Madrid ignored, and ignores, this fissure
at its peril (Basque nationalists unfortunately also tend to ignore the
fact that this fissure divides Basque from Basque on their home territory as deeply as it divides Basque nationalists and Spanish nationalists in the context of the whole state). To paper over this fissure, or
to argue that it should not exist, will not stop Basque people falling
into it as the conflict in the region grinds on relentlessly, decade
after decade.
You may say, with some justice, that the last time the fissure was
last mapped in electoral detail was 30 years ago, and that it is probably less wide and deep today. That is a rational speculation, which
opinion polls tend to support.7 Ironically, however, a real opportunity to test support for Basque sovereignty today, at a deeper level
than poll samples, was lost when the Spanish parliament, government and judiciary rejected the proposal of the Lehendakari ‘Basque
first minister,’ Juan José Ibarretxe, to hold a consulta on this issue in
2008.8 In any case, Ibarretxe’s dogged, not to say obstinate, persistence in pursuing this ‘consultation’ indicates that the fracture still
conditions political and cultural life in the region. It might be useful
at this point to ascertain what forces have kept this wound open
while a boldly restructured Basque economy has boomed, Bilbao
has famously reinvented itself, and cultural production in Euskera
has blossomed, so that a casual visitor to the region is likely to carry
away the impression of vibrant prosperity indicated in the opening
paragraphs of this article. To comprehend these forces, we must first
understand something about the factors which make the Basques a
distinctive people. The main factor, which has given many Basques
a sense of separate national identity is their language, Euskera. True,
people do not need their own language to form a nation—just think
of the Swiss, or the Americans—and nor do the speakers of minority languages always seek national status. But Euskera’s unique
linguistic status, its lack of any clear structural relationship to any
other language in the world, and certainly none to its immediate
neighbours, gives it a powerful cachet as the main badge of Basque
identity.
And while Basque nationalists have certainly “got their history
wrong” on many occasions, the history of the region does have features that distinguish it from its neighbours. The Basque were much
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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less exposed than their southern neighbours to the great Roman,
Muslim, Jewish and Visigothic cultures that dominated or influenced most parts of the peninsula—though there was a lot more
interpenetration with these cultures than Basque nationalist historiography likes to admit. Nor did this relative isolation forge any
sense of a unified political identity in the early Middle Ages. Almost
always divided among themselves on lines broadly corresponding to
the current provinces, Basque lords formed shifting alliances with
their peers, and just as easily with elements of the emerging Spanish and French kingdoms to the south and north. They became absorbed, sometimes peacefully and sometimes by military conquest,
into these kingdoms by the late Middle Ages. Even where one can
attribute the absorption of a Basque province to conquest, one can
always find Basques who were willingly fighting on the side of the
conquering monarch. The Basques’ internal feuding, known as “the
wars of the bands,” remained notorious even after formal absorption. Ironically, the remarkable grant by Castile of a fuero ‘special
right’ of “universal nobility” to the peoples of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya was probably motivated more by a desire to undermine the
authority of the fractious local aristocracy than by any recognition
of special qualities in the Basques, though of course Basque nationalists like to read it that way.9
Whatever the intentions of Castile, however, the relationship of
the Spanish Basques to this and other fueros differs from the typical experience with such special local privileges in the rest of the
emerging Spanish nation. There is little doubt that the economic
privileges extended to the Basque provinces were exceptional, and
none at all that these privileges lasted much longer into the contemporary period than elsewhere. Among other things, the customs
frontier with Spain remained on the river Ebro, rather than on the
French border, until the middle of the nineteenth century. So while
other regions of Iberia also enjoyed special rights, it is certainly
arguable that the Spanish Basques had more extensive fueros, and
held on to them longer than anybody else. The loss of these rights
after the nineteenth-century Carlist Wars, coupled with the hectic
late-nineteenth-century industrialisation of Basque cities, especially
Bilbao, and even of the countryside, created a sense of estrangement
and resentment against Spain in many Basques. As usual, it is dan-
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gerous to oversimplify: in the same period other Basques, especially
the financial-industrial oligarchy, were drawn towards closer identification with Madrid. The influx of Spanish-speaking workers to
fill the new factories, many of them in small towns, certainly created
new social tensions, which generated nationalist sentiment. A lot
of these workers brought with them Marxist and anarchist ideologies, regarded as anathema by many in this conservative Catholic
region.
It is one of the ironies of modern Basque history that ETA, expressing the most radical form of Basque nationalism today, should
have attempted to fuse it with Marxism-Leninism. This was not how
Arana had envisaged his movement ending up. Arana invented a
flag, a separatist ideology, and even a new name, Euzkadi (now Euskadi), for the Basque homeland. He preached total independence
from Spain, first for Vizcaya, and then for all seven provinces. However, during an illness in prison, shortly before his death, he shifted
his ground and argued for Basque autonomy within a Spanish state.
The PNV continues to this day to oscillate between aspiring to independence, or at least “sovereignty,” and settling for autonomy, a dynamic aptly described by Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and José
Antonio Rodríguez Ranz as “the patriotic pendulum.” The ambiguity of the party’s rhetoric as the pendulum swings has been useful
at certain elections and moments of internal crisis. But it infuriates
and baffles its critics, both in the izquierda abertzale and in Spanish nationalist parties. The Statute of Autonomy stimulated autonomist thinking in the PNV during the 1980s and much of the 1990s,
but pro-sovereignty voices have dominated again since the PNV’s
Lizarra-Garazi pact with the izquierda abertzale in 1998.10 This ambiguity understandably frustrates the PNV’s opponents, who often
compare it unfavourably with the clear-cut pro-independence program of the Scottish Nationalist Party.
The forms Francoism took in the Basque Country played, ironically enough, a significant role in forging contemporary Basque
identities which the dictator would have found repugnant. By treating Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa as occupied “traitor provinces,” and
subjecting Basque culture to harsh repression, the Caudillo gave
bitter substance to some of Arana’s claims. It was in this suffocating atmosphere of occupation that ETA was born in 1959 as a clanhttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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destine student study group, dedicated to the Basque language and
to symbolic acts of defiance like putting Basque flags on mountain
tops. But its members grew impatient with the passivity of the PNV,
representing a defeated generation, and shifted towards armed resistance to the dictatorship.
Why did the Basques, and only the Basques, develop a significant armed opposition to Franco, demanding their own state? And
why does this armed movement remain a powerful, if diminished,
destabilising factor in Spain today? Repression was bloodier in
Badajoz than it was in Bilbao, but you do not find the Extremeños
looking for independence because of what Franco did to them. The
difference is, surely, that the repression had a national dimension
in the Basque Country that it did not have in the Leftist heartlands
of Spain. It involved the repression of a much-loved language, and
the imposition of a set of symbols with which most Basques could
not identify. But, one may well ask, was not that also the situation
in Catalonia? And yet the Catalans never gave much support to the
short-lived group, Terra Lliure ‘free homeland’, which claimed to
represent them in arms against the state. Here we enter very difficult terrain. It has been well mapped, however, by the anthropologist Joseba Zulaika. He argues that there are elements inherent in
Basque culture which make many Basques identify negotiation and
compromise, essential elements in a democracy, with betrayal. Zulaika traces this resistance to compromise through many aspects
of Basque culture, from hunting through card-playing to the oral
poetry of the bertsolaris.11 He also stresses the religious formation
of many ETA members of the period, and of the metamorphosis
of religious vocation into existentialist and Marxist ideologies of
commitment and action. For an insider’s version of the world which
gave birth to ETA, there are few, if any, richer sources.
Using a more conventional set of sociological tools, the Italian
writer Daniele Conversi explicitly contrasts the “alternative routes
to nationalist mobilisation” taken by the Basques and Catalans. His
most fertile idea is that it was the “weakness,” not the strength, of
Basque culture and identity that led to the emergence of a violent
nationalist movement. The Catalan language had a literary tradition comparable with the richest in Europe, and was still a means
of daily communication for millions in the 1950s. This was a source
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of great national self-confidence for the Catalans. This vibrant cultural world gave them a stage on which to experience and play out
their sense of national identity even under the dictatorship. The
simple fact that Catalan is also relatively easy to learn by osmosis,
because of its similarities to Castilian, meant that immigrants were
much more easily assimilated into this Catalan universe. In short,
the Catalan nationalists under the dictatorship experienced their
culture as oppressed, but by no means thought of it as threatened
with extinction.
In contrast, the Basque literary tradition, at least in terms of the
written word, is decidedly thin until the last century. However, the
all-too-common impression that Euskera has no literary tradition,
that it has never been more than a “primitive” and “rural” language
with a purely oral culture, and that it is kept on life support today
by subsidies from the autonomous government, is false.12 Bernart
Dechepare’s Linguae Vasconum Primitiae, ‘The first book published
in Euskera’ in fact came respectably early by comparison with other
vernacular printed literatures, in 1545. But Dechepere’s collection
of religious, secular and erotic poetry contains a verse in Kontrapas which, while appropriate enough for such a novel venture at the
time, was still sadly relevant to publishing in Basque four centuries
later:
Euskara,
jalgi hadi plazara.
Bertze jendek uste zuten
ezin eskriba zaiteien;
orai dute forogatu
enganatu zirela.

Euskara,
get out into the street!
Many people thought
writing in Basque was impossible.
Now they recognise
They were deceiving themselves. (116)

Most of the sparse crop of books which followed were translations of religious works, including a fine Calvinist New Testament.
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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The masterpiece of early Basque literature, Gero ‘Later’ (published
in 1643), is a work of lively originality, though it has a religious
theme, the vice of procrastination. Atxaga describes its author, Pedro Axular, as the Basque Cervantes.13 Atxaga acts as a (somewhat
reluctant) international spokesperson for Basque literature because
his works have been more widely translated than any other Basque
author.14 He recognises that the Basque canon has been very uneven, indeed that it has almost disappeared at times, and that the
literary language had to be virtually reinvented by the poet Gabriel
Aresti in the Franco period. But Atxaga argues that this may not
be a critical deprivation for contemporary writers in Euskera because “el lenguaje literario es único, que sólo hay uno y es universal”
‘there is only one literary language, and that language is universal’
(Henry Bengoa 73). That is, writers are free to mine classics from
many other cultures, something he has done triumphantly himself
in his best-known work to date, Obabakoak ‘People of [the village
of] Obaba.’ This loosely linked series of stories are unmistakeably
Basque in their setting, but are almost all adaptations of stories from
the European and Middle Eastern traditions.
There is a strong element of making a virtue out of a necessity
in this argument, however. While all writers can draw on literature
in languages foreign to them, the best case for writing in their own
language is surely that they can say things in it that can be fully expressed in no other way. So a limited tradition in one’s own tongue
has to be an impoverishment. Atxaga, who is not afraid of contradicting himself, comes very close to saying this elsewhere: “Creo
que la relación con el euskara … es lo más característico de nuestro
comportamiento y de nuestro modo de vivir, algo que no podemos
perder sin perdernos, al menos un poco, a nosotros mismos” ‘I believe that the relationship with Euskera … is the most characteristic
thing about our behaviour and our way of life, something which we
cannot lose without losing, at least a little, our own selves’ (Henry
Bengoa 57). And Euskera, as we have seen, cannot be learned by
osmosis, but only by a long period of study and immersion, far beyond the cultural and financial means of most immigrants. As a
result, Basque nationalists had long felt that their culture was not
just under siege but in danger of complete disappearance. During the Franco period, there was a widespread sense of despair,
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a sentimento agónico, of living on the threshold of extinction as a
people. As Conversi puts it, the first generations of ETA believed
that “only drastic measures such as mass insurrection could save
them from their doom,” and this feeling found a broad echo in the
Basque population. Conversi concludes that the Basque experience
is one where “violent conflicts have been revived by weak identities,
and weak identities have been rejuvenated through violent conflict”
(268). Atxaga echoes this anxiety many Basques feel about losing
their language, and therefore their identity. He is keenly aware that,
as he puts it, “la falta de reconocimiento mata” ‘lack of recognition
kills’ (Henry Bengoa 58), that without a community of writers and
readers in Euskera, some kind of extinction would indeed occur.
Today, such an extinction seems less likely than at any time in
the last 150 years. A quarter of the people in the CAV now speak
Euskera as their first language, compared to fifteen percent when
Franco died.15 From the outside, because of his success in translation, it sometimes seems as if Atxaga is the only contemporary
Basque producing a significant literary output; but several other
distinctive writers, like Ramón Saizarbitoria, Joseba Sarrionandia
and Arantxa Urretavizcaya are widely considered to be first-class.
Widely, that is among the very small public which actually reads
their books in Euskera, and the rather larger ones, inside and outside the Basque Country, which read them in Spanish. Nevertheless,
Euskera is still clearly vulnerable on both the vernacular and cultural fronts, though the threats today are more likely to come from
the globalisation of culture, coupled with the indifference of many
Basques, than from any ill intent from Spanish nationalism.
Atxaga has rejected ETA’s ideology since the transition to democracy, and is increasingly inclined to blame apathy and inertia
at home rather than any exterior agency for the fact that Euskera
as a literary and spoken language is still relatively weak. Nor does
he share any radical vision of a monocultural Basque Country.
His position is unusually pluralistic, in that he wants to celebrate
all Basque identities, despite coming from an Euskaldun (Basquespeaking) milieu. “Euskera [he told me] is not the Basque language.
It is a Basque language. We are rich in the Basque Country, we have
three languages, Euskera, Spanish and French. And now, with globalisation, the movies and rock’n’roll, we have a fourth language,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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English.”16
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Atxaga was a member of Pott
(‘failure’ in Euskera), a literary group which produced an eponymous and very influential magazine. Mari José Olaziregi describes
these writers thus in Waking the Hedgehog: “the group manifested
their literary preferences clearly by concentrating on literatures from
central Europe (Kafka, Werfell, Celan, and so on) and the Englishspeaking world (detective novels, film noir, adventure novels), as
Borges had recommended in his essays. But, above all, the members
of Pott defended the autonomous nature of literature” (21). This
meant rescuing Basque culture from the narrow vision of Basque
nationalism, though not all the members of the group have been as
consistent as Atxaga in escaping dogmatic political categories. Sarrionandia was imprisoned on charges of ETA membership in 1980,
and made a dramatic escape five years later, concealed in an amplifier used by a band visiting his jail. The sophisticated fiction he has
continued to produce while underground is praised by many who
find his politics repellent. In sharp contrast to Sarrionandia’s trajectory, fellow Pott alumnus Jon Juaristi (who had been a member of
ETA in the early 1970s), went so far in rejecting his old loyalties that
he became an articulate and passionate advocate for the Spanish nationalism of the Partido Popular in the Aznar period.17
The very diversity of paths chosen by these members of Pott
illustrates the often neglected fact that Basque identity is not narrowly particular but remarkably heterogeneous. Ordinary families
can display the same uncomfortable plurality in politics: you may
find that a father is in the PP, a daughter in Batasuna, and a cousin
is a councillor for the PSOE. Bilbao, as its wiser citizens will often remind you with pride, not only gave birth to Arana, father of
Basque nationalism, but to Dolores Ibárruri, la pasionaria, icon of
the international communist movement, and to several of the seminal figures in the foundation of the Spanish Socialist Party. And do
not forget, they will add, that in the mansions of the Bilbao suburb
of Neguri one could always finds some of the staunchest defenders
of conservative Spanish nationalism.
Socialists and conservatives whose primary identity is Spanish
collectively represent close to half of the Basque electorate. They
do not live in ghettos and in many respects live very similar lives
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to Basque nationalists, celebrating the same fiestas and supporting the same football teams. In particular, those conservatives who
come from a Carlist background share many traditions with their
Basque nationalist neighbours, from pelota to Catholicism to use of
the Basque language.18 Their reading of the region’s history is drawn
from many of the same materials as those which furnish Basque
nationalism’s narratives, but they construct a completely different
national edifice. As Marianne Heiberg pointed out long ago in an
excellent but often overlooked book on the region, The Making of
the Basque Nation, each narrative is “partially valid” in its own way
(ix). In the year 2000 I asked Oreja, a senior member of the PP at
Spanish and Basque level, whether a “Downing Street Declaration”
from Madrid would break the logjam in the region (World 25).19
He answered with a resounding “No” on two counts. The first was
based on frank self-interest. It is an open secret, he said, that Spain
“does” have self strategic and economic interests in the Basque
Country, and very big ones at that. The second, quoted at the outset
of this article, was based on his Spanish nationalist reading of history, which puts the region not on the periphery, but at “the heart
of Spain.” Oreja declared, with patent sincerity, that the Basques had
been the initiators of the reconquista and had thus been part of the
lifeblood of the Spanish nationalist project from its inception. One
can challenge the details of his historical account, just as one can
question Basque nationalist orthodoxy, but, forgive me for repeating, this is to miss the point. The point is that many Basques, and
many Spaniards outside the Basque Country, choose to believe that
the region is an integral part of what makes Spain Spanish.20 As long
as they do—and it is likely to be for a very long time—their stories
are also part of the meta-narrative of the Basques.
Recent research suggests that more Basques identify themselves
as being both Basque and Spanish than as subscribing solely to one
or other of these identities (Balfour and Quiroga 4). One of the few
beauties of the Belfast Agreement which ended the Irish conflict
was the recognition, by both sides, of the legitimacy of the identity
of their opponents.21 Unionists recognize the right of Irish nationalists and republicans to Irish symbols and traditions, and Republicans and nationalists recognize the right of unionists to celebrate
the British monarchy and the Union flag on Irish soil. All Basque
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
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factions have, so far, taken from the Irish experience only what is
advantageous to their own cause in the short term. The concept of
respect for multiple identities could well be to the advantage of all
of them. In any case, as outsiders, we cannot understand the Basque
Country through the mutually exclusive prisms of Basque and
Spanish nationalism. We can only see the whole rich, vibrant and
tragic picture through the binocular visions, often contradictory,
of writers like Atxaga, Baroja and Unamuno, and indeed of filmmakers like Julio Medem. The Basque poet Gabriel Aresti, whose
reclamation of Basque identity and the Basque language in the dark
days of the dictatorship inspired so many young Basques, concludes
his best-known poem, Nire Aitaren Etxea ‘The House of My Father,’
with these lines:
Ni hilen naiz,
nire arima galduko da,
nire askazia galduko da,
baina nire aitaren etxea
iraunen du
zutik
I shall die,
My soul will be lost,
My descendants will be lost,
But the house of my father
Will remain
Standing. (260-61)

Whatever form the Basque house takes in the future, it must
surely be strong enough, and broad enough, to accommodate all the
identities of all its children.22
Notes
1 The phrase “Basque conflict” is itself a controversial one. Apologists for ETA
often use it to imply that acts of violence in the Basque Country are the inevitable consequence of the conflict, rather than the responsibility of those who
carry them out. Yet those who argue that no political conflict exists—that is,
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that the problem is one of criminality, pure and simple, by the terrorists—are
blanking out the context in which these acts take place.
2 Batasuna is a pro-independence party close to the thinking of ETA, banned
since 2002 under Spain’s Ley de Partidos ‘Parties’ Law,’ because it refuses to
condemn ETA attacks. The judicial offensive is based on a blurring of the line
between radical activism and terrorism. But this line is often blurred in reality:
the kale borroka ‘street struggle’ is a form of low-intensity terrorism or political
vandalism and bullying by teenage radicals close to ETA.
3 A minister and deputy minister from Felipe González’s center-left PSOE
government has been found guilty of organizing a kidnapping associated with
the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), which killed 26 people in the
French Basque Country between 1983 and 1986 (Woodworth, Dirty War 426).
4 Basque nationalism is weakest (but probably growing) in the French Basque
Country (Iparralde in Euskera), with about ten percent of the vote going to abertzale parties. I do not discuss it here in any detail because it is inappropriate
to the frame of this edition of the journal, which directs us towards “the case
of Spain.” But it is important to remember that, for Basque nationalists of all
stripes, Iparralde is an integral part of their region. For a discussion of related
issues, see Woodworth’s The Basque Country (245-69).
5 Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution references, in the same sentence, the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation” and guarantees “the right to autonomy
of the nationalities and regions that are integral to it.” This “feat of semantic
engineering” (Balfour and Quiroga 46) does not even specify which parts of
Spain are regions, and which nationalities, nor does it clarify the relationship
between “nation” and “nationality.” For an excellent discussion see Balfour and
Quiroga (45-54).
6 ETA-Militar, the only ETA operating since the early 1980s, and the izquierda
abertzale have never supported the Statute of Autonomy.
7 A survey cited by Balfour and Quiroga indicated that 25% of Basques felt
solely Basque, and a further 19% more Basque than Spanish, with 34% equally
Basque and Spanish and 8% more Spanish than Basque or only Spanish (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Boletín 31, 2003: 3-4). Most surveys suggest that little more than 50% of Basques consider themselves Basque nationalists, and by no means all of these would fall into the “solely Basque” category
and support full Basque independence.
8 The tendency of much of the Spanish judiciary to act as a chorus for the government of the day, rather than as an independent and separate power of the
state, is of considerable assistance to Basque nationalist propagandists when
they seek to discredit Spanish democracy. The same goes, only more so, for the
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judicial offensive against Basque radicals, which has attracted sober criticism
from human rights bodies.
9 The granting of aristocratic status to an entire population had the paradoxical
outcome of creating an egalitarian democracy, at least in theory, as Juan Aranzadi has pointed out (51).
10 This pact, explicitly modeled on selective aspects of the Irish peace process,
formed a Basque “pan-nationalist front” ranging from ETA to the PNV, in support of Basque national sovereignty. It foundered when ETA ended the ceasefire on which it had been based, alleging that the PNV had not taken agreed
steps to set up sovereign Basque institutions across the seven provinces.
11 Bertsolaris are spontaneous versifiers, capable of composing long pieces in
public, alternating verses with a competitor following a common theme and
rhyme scheme.
12 There is, indeed, a very lively culture of oral poetry in Euskera to this day.
At most Basque fiestas, and at many informal social gatherings, two or more
bertsolariak ‘versifiers’ will compose and exchange stanzas spontaneously over
long periods, following a set subject and rhyme scheme.
13 The pen-name of Pedro Daquerre Azpilicueta, parish priest of the FrenchBasque village of Sara.
14 The London Observer included him in its 1999 list of the “21 top writers for
the 21st century.”
15 The contemporary figures for the French Basque Country and Navarre
are 22% and 11% respectively. See <http://www.eustat.es/elem/ele0004600/
tbl0004653_i.html>.
16 The quotation is from an interview with the author in Reno, February
2008.
17 Juaristi’s ideological inversion is not unusual among former leftist members of ETA. Many individuals, it seems, can only abandon one dogmatism by
clutching on to another. And while Juaristi has abandoned the identity of his
own tribe, and written beautifully about the personal cost this departure exacts
in El Bucle Melancólico ‘The Melancholy Loop’ (268), he has gone further than
most of his former comrades in embracing an entirely new identity, that of
Judaism and the defence of Zionism, a move which must have tested the latent
anti-Semitism of some of his new bedfellows in Madrid.
18 Antonio Basagoiti, a leader of the Basque PP, makes a case for the Basque
identity of PP voters in the region (Woodworth, Basque Country 110-11).
19 The Downing Street Declaration (1993) was a joint Irish-British statement
in which Britain confirmed that it had “no selfish strategic or economic interest

Published by New Prairie Press

19

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
294			

ST&TCL, Volume 33, No. 2 (Summer 2009)

in Northern Ireland.” It was a key moment in the Irish peace process, convincing the IRA and Sinn Féin that Britain would not stand in the way of a united
Ireland if a majority in Northern Ireland voted to leave the UK.
20 A comparison with Northern Ireland is instructive here. It is a long time
since any British conservative has believed Northern Ireland was remotely
close to the heart of the United Kingdom.
21 For a discussion of the relationship between the Irish and Basque peace processes, see Woodworth’s “The Spanish-Basque Peace Process.”
22 New waves of immigration are changing these identities all the time. It is fascinating to watch young Asian children, adopted by Basque parents, participating in Basque fiestas. Or sub-Saharan Africans working on fishing boats where
the dominant language is Euskera. Who knows what they may contribute to the
increasingly always rich and complex identity of the land of the Basques?
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